The straw
that broke the camel's back
This is an excerpt of a
recent article by Nobel laureate Joseph
Stiglitz published in Al-Jazeera. (http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/10/2011104111133888567.html)
The economy
was very sick before the crisis; the housing bubble merely papered over its
weaknesses. Without bubble-supported consumption, there would have been a
massive shortfall in aggregate demand. Instead, the personal saving rate
plunged to one per cent, and the bottom 80 per cent of those in the US were
spending, every year, roughly 110 per cent of their income.
Even if the
financial sector were fully repaired, and even if these profligate Americans
hadn't learned a lesson about the importance of saving, their consumption would
be limited to 100 per cent of their income. So anyone who talks about the
consumer "coming back" - even after deleveraging - is living in a
fantasy world.
Fixing the financial sector was necessary for economic recovery, but far from sufficient. To understand what needs to be done, we have to understand the economy's problems before the crisis hit.
Fixing the financial sector was necessary for economic recovery, but far from sufficient. To understand what needs to be done, we have to understand the economy's problems before the crisis hit.
First, the US and the
world were victims of their own success. Rapid productivity increases in
manufacturing had outpaced growth in demand, which meant that manufacturing
employment decreased. Labor had to shift to services. For the US and Europe,
the need for labor to move out of manufacturing was compounded by shifting
comparative advantage: Not only are the total number of manufacturing jobs
limited globally, but a smaller share of those jobs will be local.
Globalization
has been one, but only one, of the factors contributing to the second key
problem - growing inequality. Shifting income from those who would spend it to
those who won't lowers aggregate demand. By the same token, soaring energy
prices shifted purchasing power from the United
States and Europe to oil
exporters, who, recognizing the volatility of energy prices, rightly saved much
of this income.
The final problem contributing to weakness in global aggregate demand was emerging markets' massive buildup of foreign-exchange reserves - partly motivated by the mismanagement of the 1997-98 East Asia crisis by the International Monetary Fund and the US Treasury. Countries recognized that, without reserves, they risked losing their economic sovereignty. Many said: "Never again." But, while the buildup of reserves - currently around $7.6 trillion in emerging and developing economies - protected them, money going into reserves was money not spent.
Where are we today in addressing these underlying problems? To take the last one first, those countries that built up large reserves were able to weather the economic crisis better, so the incentive to accumulate reserves is even stronger. Similarly, while bankers have regained their bonuses, workers are seeing their wages eroded and their hours diminished, further widening the income gap. Moreover, the US has not shaken off its dependence on oil. With oil prices back above $100 a barrel this summer - and still high - money is once again being transferred to the oil-exporting countries. And the structural transformation of the advanced economies, implied by the need to move labor out of traditional manufacturing branches, is occurring very slowly.
Government plays a central role in financing the services that people want, such as education and health care. And government-financed education and training, in particular, will be critical in restoring competitiveness in Europe and the US. But both have chosen fiscal austerity, all but ensuring that their economies' transitions will be slow.
The final problem contributing to weakness in global aggregate demand was emerging markets' massive buildup of foreign-exchange reserves - partly motivated by the mismanagement of the 1997-98 East Asia crisis by the International Monetary Fund and the US Treasury. Countries recognized that, without reserves, they risked losing their economic sovereignty. Many said: "Never again." But, while the buildup of reserves - currently around $7.6 trillion in emerging and developing economies - protected them, money going into reserves was money not spent.
Where are we today in addressing these underlying problems? To take the last one first, those countries that built up large reserves were able to weather the economic crisis better, so the incentive to accumulate reserves is even stronger. Similarly, while bankers have regained their bonuses, workers are seeing their wages eroded and their hours diminished, further widening the income gap. Moreover, the US has not shaken off its dependence on oil. With oil prices back above $100 a barrel this summer - and still high - money is once again being transferred to the oil-exporting countries. And the structural transformation of the advanced economies, implied by the need to move labor out of traditional manufacturing branches, is occurring very slowly.
Government plays a central role in financing the services that people want, such as education and health care. And government-financed education and training, in particular, will be critical in restoring competitiveness in Europe and the US. But both have chosen fiscal austerity, all but ensuring that their economies' transitions will be slow.
The prescription for what ails the global economy follows directly from the diagnosis: Strong government expenditures, aimed at facilitating restructuring, promoting energy conservation, and reducing inequality, and a reform of the global financial system that creates an alternative to the buildup of reserves. Eventually, the world's leaders - and the voters who elect them - will come to recognize this. As growth prospects continue to weaken, they will have no choice. But how much pain will we have to bear in the meantime?
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